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"RESPONDEAT INFERIOR": The Rule of Vanderpool v. Grange
Insurance 4ssociation, 110 Wash. 2d 483, 756 P.2d 111 (1988)?
AbstracL At common law, the majority of states held that a tort claimant's release of

either an employer whose sole liability was vicarious or the employee who had committed
the tort operated to release the other. Washington follows this position for releases of an
employee, but Vanderpool v. Grange Insurance Association announces a different rule for
releases of an employer. This Note examines Vanderpool in view of relevant public policies, statutes, and prior case law and recommends adopting a rule that the release of a
solvent employer operate to release its employee-tortfeasor.

Driving in the course of her employment, a delivery-person negligently collides with another car. The driver of the other car experiences back pain. His doctor diagnoses only minor injuries and advises
him that he will soon be able to resume work A few weeks after the
accident, the injured driver settles with the delivery firm's insurerfor
payment of the wages he has lost, the medical and car repairexpenses
he has incurred, and a sum for his pain and suffering. The general
release he signs names only the firm; it does not mention the firm's
employee.
A month after the settlement, the injured driver'spain worsens. His
doctor now diagnoses a permanentand disablingback injury, caused by
the collision. The driver sues the employee. The court, citing Vanderpool v. Grange Insurance Association,i rejects the employee's defense
that by settling with the employer the driver also released the employee
from liability. The driver obtains a substantialjudgment covering
future lost wages and pain and suffering. When he executes on this
judgment the employee loses all of her assets including her home.
Meanwhile, her employer records anotherprofitable year.
In Vanderpool v. Grange Insurance Association,2 the Washington
Supreme Court considered the effect of a settlement between an
injured tort claimant and an employer liable solely under respondeat
superior. The supreme court held the settlement with the employer
did not bar the claimant from suing the employee-tortfeasor 3 As
illustrated above, this holding could upset the distribution of tort liabilities contemplated by the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 Hundreds of millions of dollars are annually spent in Washington to insure
1. 110 Wash. 2d 483, 756 P.2d 111 (1988).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 484, 756 P.2d at 11.
4. The doctrine of respondeat superior holds an employer liable when its employees commit
torts in the course of their employment. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69, at
499-500 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER].
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against commercial losses.' Even a slight shifting of tort liability from
employers could therefore have significant monetary impact upon
employees.
The Washington Supreme Court's opinion in Vanderpool did not
consider the loss distribution objectives of respondeat superior, nor did
it give proper effect to relevant Washington tort reforms. Moreover,
the court's decision in Vanderpool is inconsistent with two of its earlier
decisions: Glover v. Tacoma GeneralHospital,6 and Bennett v. Shinoda
Floral,Inc.7 This Note will analyze the supreme court's decision in
Vanderpool and will offer suggestions for approaching future similar
cases.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

Facts, Reasoning, and Holding of Vanderpool

Vanderpool arose out of a simple auto accident. While driving
within the scope of his employment, a garage-keeper's employee
backed into another car, causing seemingly minor injury to the other
driver's knee and damaging her car.8
Discussions between the injured driver and the insurance company
for the garage-keeper began on the day following the accident.9 These
parties settled slightly more than a month after the accident, executing
both a release and a future medical expenses agreement. The release
named only the employer. 10
When she signed the release, the claimant expected that her knee
would improve.'1 It did not improve as expected, and she sought
additional medical treatment.1 2 About two months after the signing of
the release, her doctor recommended diagnostic knee surgery. The
employer's insurance company refused to pay the lost wages associ5. Commercial insurance premiums cost Washington policyholders $599,663,000 in 1987.
INSURANCE INFORMATION

INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS: 1988-89

PROPERTY/CASUALTY

FACT BOOK 41-42.

6. 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983).
7. 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).
8. 110 Wash. 2d at 484, 756 P.2d at 111-12. The injured driver suffered no fractures. She
returned to work on crutches the next day.
9. Id. at 485, 756 P.2d at 112.
10. Id. The employer's insurance company paid $2,840.16 for the release: $1,000 for pain and
suffering, plus compensation for the claimant's medical bills and for her property damage. The
future medical expenses agreement reserved $2,000 for medical expenses over the next 18
months, apparently recognizing that the claimant's knee had not healed completely. See id.
11. Her doctor had informed her that she had probably suffered only a bruise and a strained
ligament. Id.
12. Id. at 486, 756 P.2d at 112.
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ated with this surgery because the future medical expenses agreement
did not cover lost wages.13
The claimant then sued for recission and a judgment for her personal injuries and property damage.14 Although the trial court found
no fraud or overreaching in the settlement of the claim, it granted
recission on the theory that the insurance adjuster had engaged in a
"negligent representation by omission.' 15 But the Washington Court
of Appeals reversed, holding the adjuster owed no affirmative duty to
the claimant. Further, relying on Glover v. Tacoma General Hospital,16 the court of appeals held that the claimant's release of the sol17
vent employer from vicarious liability also released the employee.
The claimant petitioned the Washington Supreme Court to review
whether an unrepresented claimant who releases a principal before filing a lawsuit thereby also releases the agent whose actions caused the
claimant's injuries.' 8 The supreme court held that settlement with the
principal does not automatically release the agent. 9 The supreme
court rejected the court of appeals' position that Vanderpool was controlled by Glover.2 0 Rather, the supreme court considered whether the
release was intended to cover both principal and agent. 2 1 Noting that
the release did not mention the agent and showed no intention to
release him, the supreme court held that the release did not relieve the
agent from any liability to the claimant.2 2
B.

Common Law Doctrine of Respondeat Superior

The doctrine of respondeat superior 23 creates vicarious liability by
holding an employer responsible for the torts its employees commit in
the course of their employment.24 The doctrine imputes the
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. The trial court found the adjuster had breached an affirmative duty to inform the
claimant that she could settle the bodily injury and property damage claims separately.
16. 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983). In Glover the Washington Supreme Court had
ruled that a release of solvent agents operated to release their vicariously liable principal.
17. 110 Wash. 2d at 486, 756 P.2d at 112-13.
18. Id. at 486, 756 P.2d at 113.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 487, 756 P.2d at 113.
21. Id.at 488, 756 P.2d at 113.
22. Id. at 489, 756 P.2d at 114.
23. A Latin term meaning "let the master answer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1179 (5th
ed. 1979).
24. 1 J. LEE & B. LINDAHL, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILrrY AND LnIGATION § 7.01, at
185-86 (1988). Where respondeat iuperior liability applies, the terms "employer," "principal,"
and "master" are synonymous, as are the terms "employee," "agent," and "servant." Id at
§ 7.02, at 186. This Note adopts these interchangeable usages.
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employee's negligence to the employer." Technically, the vicariously
liable employer and the primarily liable employee are not joint
tortfeasors; however, they are jointly and severally liable to the
26

plaintiff.

Respondeat superior liability permits a plaintiff to elect a remedy
against the employer, the employee, or both.27 Election of a remedy
against one of the parties to the employer-employee relationship bars
further action against the other party.2 8
At common law, an employer who paid damages to a claimant
because of respondeat superior could seek full indemnity from the
employee-tortfeasor. 29 The employee was viewed as the active and
primarily liable wrongdoer; the employer was considered innocent,
passive, and only secondarily liable.3 0
Several modem justifications for respondeat superior are recognized. First, respondeat superior helps assure full compensation of
tortiously injured parties. The doctrine provides the security of an
additional defendant, thus addressing the problem of judgment-proof
defendant employees. 3 1 Second, the doctrine is justified as a matter of
fairness. On-the-job torts by employees are foreseeable consequences
of an employer's enterprise; justice therefore requires holding the
employer responsible for its costs of doing business. 32 Third, employers possess superior loss-spreading abilities because they can adjust
their prices or rates. Neither tort victims nor employees can absorb
the costs of losses and distribute them throughout society as efficiently
25. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 69, at 499.
26. Finney v. Farmers Ins. Co., 92 Wash. 2d 748, 754, 600 P.2d 1272, 1276 (1979), modified
on other grounds, Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 723-24, 658 P.2d 1230, 1239
(1983); 1 J. LEE & B. LINDAL, supra note 24, § 7.02, at 187.

27. Johns v. Hake, 15 Wash. 2d 651, 656, 131 P.2d 933, 935 (1942).
28. See Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 719-20, 658 P.2d at 1237. But a principal is not discharged
from liability where the judgment discharging an agent is based merely upon a personal defense
of the agent. Vern J. Oja & Assocs. v. Washington Park Towers, Inc., 89 Wash. 2d 72, 77, 569
P.2d 1141, 1144 (1977). Further, the Washington Supreme Court recently abandoned the
election of remedies doctrine in cases where a contracting agent has failed to disclose the

principal's existence. Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wash. 2d 695, 70506, 756 P.2d 717,
722 (1988).

29. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 51, at 341.
30. See Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash. 2d 483, 487-88, 756 P.2d 111, 113

(1988).
31.

2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 26.5, at 1371 (1956); RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 comment b (1982).
32. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 69, at 500; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
comment a (1958).

OF AGENCY § 219
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as can employers.3 3 Fourth, compared to their employees, employers
generally also have greater resources with which to pay judgments and
to procure liability insurance. 34 Finally, respondeat superior liability
provides employers with an incentive to promote safety on the job.3 5
The majority of jurisdictions which have decided the issue hold that
releasing an employer from vicarious liability also operates to release
the employee from primary liability. 36 The principles that the victim's
damages are not severable and that the victim is entitled only to a
single satisfaction for the injury form the basis for the majority rule.3 7
C. Legislative and JudicialDevelopments in Washington
In Washington, the liability of employers for the torts of their
employees has been affected by two enactments: the 1981 Product Liability and Tort Reform Act3 8 and the 1986 Tort Reform Act.3 9 Further, in two recent cases involving vicarious liability, the Washington
Supreme Court considered the effect of releasing one party to the
employment or agency relationship.'
L

1981 Product Liability and Tort Reform Act

Several changes made by the 1981 Product Liability and Tort
Reform Act ("1981 Act") have implications for respondeat superior
liability or for the specific problem in Vanderpool. These changes
include abolishing common law indemnity, creating contribution
rights among joint tortfeasors, and permitting partial settlements to
release only the settling defendant.
Section 12(1) of the 1981 Act instituted contribution rights among
jointly and severally liable tortfeasors, based upon their comparative
33. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 26.1, at 1363-64; id § 26.5, at 1371-73;
PROSSER, supra note 4, § 69, at 500-01.
34. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 26.1, at 1363; PROSSER, supra note 4, § 69 at
500.
35. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 26.1, at 1364. But see PROSSER, supra
note 4, § 69, at 501 (characterizing safety incentive justification as "makeweight").
36. See, ag., Sade v. Hemstrom, 205 Kan. 514, 417 P.2d 340, 346-49 (1970); Willis v. Total
Health Care of Detroit, 125 Mich. App. 612, 337 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1983); Hartigan v. Dickson, 81
Minn. 284, 83 N.W. 1091, 1092 (1900); Ericksen v. Pearson, 211 Neb. 466, 319 N.W.2d 76, 78,
81-83 (1982); Hunt v. Ziegler, 271 S.W. 936, 938, 940 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). But see Haem v.
Thompson, 143 Colo. 298, 353 P.2d 73, 74, 76 (1980); Losito v. Kruse, 186 Ohio St. 183, 24
N.E.2d 705, 707-08 (1940).
37. Annotation, Release of(or Covenant Not to Sue) Masteror Principalas Affecting Liability
of Servant or Agent for Tort, or Vice Versa, 92 A.L.R.2d 533, 537 (1963).
38. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27 [hereinafter 1981 Act].
39. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305 [hereinafter 1986 Act].
40. See infra text accompanying notes 49-70.
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fault.4 1 Section 12(3) abolished the common law right of indemnity
between active and passive tortfeasors.4 2 Essentially, then, the 1981
Act substituted contribution for common law indemnity.43 As the net
result, vicariously liable employers may now seek contribution-but
not common law indemnity-from their primarily liable employees.
At common law, the release of one joint tortfeasor released all of the
jointly and severally liable tortfeasors. 4 The 1981 Act modified this
rule. Under section 14, a released person is discharged from liability
for contribution, but nonsettling persons are discharged from liability
only if the release so provides. 45 Any judgment the plaintiff wins
against nonsettling defendants will be reduced by the settlement
amount.4 6
A final relevant provision of the 1981 Act-the last sentence of section 12()-permits courts to treat two or more persons as a single
entity for contribution purposes.4 7 The section-by-section analysis of
the 1981 Act did not explain this sentence.4 "
Glover v. Tacoma General Hospital

2.

The Washington Supreme Court interpreted the 1981 Act in Glover
v. Tacoma General Hospital.49 Glover presented the problem of
whether a release of primarily liable agents also released their vicari41. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 12(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1987)).
42. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 12(3) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1987)).
The abolition of common law indemnity applies to respondeat superior liability as well as to
other active-passive tortfeasor situations. See Johnson v. Continental West, Inc., 99 Wash. 2d
555, 663 P.2d 482 (1983).
43. Johnson, 99 Wash. 2d at 560, 663 P.2d at 485.
44. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON TORT AND PRODUCT LIABILITY REFORM, DRAFT
FINAL REPORT, reprinted in 1981 WASH. SENATE JOURNAL 637 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].

45. 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 14(2) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1987)).
Under this statute, covenants not to sue, covenants not to enforce judgment, and similar
agreements have the same effect as releases.
For releases which extinguish a third person's liability to the claimant, and which were
reasonable when agreed upon, § 12(2) preserved the releasee's contribution rights-an exception
to the 1981 Act's general rule that settlements extinguish releasees' contribution rights. 1981
Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 12(2) (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.040(2) (1987)).
46. Provided the amount of the settlement was reasonable at the time it was agreed upon. Id.
The court determines reasonableness after a hearing following five days' notice to all "parties."
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1) (1987). If the court finds the settlement was unreasonable
when agreed upon, the plaintiff's judgment is reduced by an amount the court determines is
reasonable. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1987). The reasonableness hearing is meant to
prevent collusive partial settlements. SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 636.
47. "[T]he court may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single person
for purposes of contribution." 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 12(1) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.040(1) (1987)).
48. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 635-36.
49. 98 Wash. 2d 708, 658 P.2d 1230 (1983).
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ously liable principal." The suit began as a medical malpractice
action for a patient who had lapsed into a coma after receiving anes-

thesia at the defendant hospital."
After the agents in Glover settled with the plaintiff, the trial court
denied the hospital's motion for a summary judgment absolving it
from vicarious liability. 2 The Washington Supreme Court remanded,
holding that the single entity statute, section 4.22.040(1), required dismissal of the vicarious liability claim against the hospital. 3 Given a
reasonable settlement and solvent settling agents, the supreme court
answered in the affirmative the question of whether the release of the

agents operated to release their principal.

4

In discussing this question in Glover, the supreme court noted the
position of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments that a vicariously
liable principal will ordinarily not be discharged when the responsible
agent settles.5 The court acknowledged that it had appeared to follow
the Restatement's position in its earlier decision of Finney v. Farmers
Insurance Co.,56 but it distinguished Finney on the ground that the
settling defendant in Finney apparently was not solvent enough to
have paid all of the plaintiff's damages.5 7 Moreover, the court reasoned, the provision in the subsequently enacted contribution statute
for treating two persons as'a single entity authorized a different result
from Finney."8 According to the court, because the factors used to
determine whether a settlement is reasonable 9 apply equally between
the principal and the agent, the single entity statute can be used to
50. Id. at 718, 658 P.2d at 1236.

51. Id. at 710, 658 P.2d at 1232. The plaintiff in Glover alleged that two agents of the hospital
had negligently administered the anesthesia, and that the hospital was vicariously liable for its
agents' negligence. The agents settled but the hospital did not. Id at 710-11, 658 P.2d at 1232.
The trial court approved the agents' settlement as reasonable and dismissed the hospital's
contribution claim against them, thus exposing the hospital to a potential verdict of $2.5 million
with only a $575,000 credit for settlement proceeds. Id at 711, 658 P.2d at 1233.
52. Id at 711, 658 P.2d at 1233.
53. Id. at 711-12, 658 P.2d at 1232-33.
54. Id at 718-19, 658 P.2d at 1236.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 51 comment b (1982).
56. 92 Wash. 2d 748, 600 P.2d 1272 (1979).
57. 98 Wash. 2d at 721, 658 P.2d at 1238. The Glover court then modified Finney: it
instructed that to protect the right to proceed against a nonsettling principal, future plaintiffs
should request a statement on the record of the reasonableness hearing that full compensation
was unlikely to have been obtained from the settling agent. Id. at 724 n.4, 658 P.2d at 1239 n.4.
58. Id at 721, 658 P.2d at 1238.
59. Earlier in its Glover opinion, the supreme court had adopted the following factors for trial
courts to use in evaluating the reasonableness of settlements:
[Tihe releasing person's damages; the merits of the releasing person's liability theory; the
merits of the released person's defense theory; the released person's relative faults; the risks
and expenses of continued litigation; the released person's ability to pay; any evidence of bad
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discharge a principal when its agent entered into a reasonable settlement with the claimant. To the Glover court, a determination that the
agent's settlement was reasonable had the same effect as a determination that the claim had been satisfied as to both principal and agent.6
The hospital in Glover argued that because the 1981 legislature had
deliberately retained joint and several liability the court was prohibited
from extinguishing a vicarious liability claim upon the agent's settlement. 61 The court disagreed. Noting that joint and several liability
furthers the policy of full compensation, the court concluded that this
policy was adequately served when the plaintiff had settled for a reasonable amount with a solvent agent from whom she could have
obtained full compensation. In such a case, the court stated, the tort
law policy of full compensation did not require preserving a claim for
the plaintiff against the principal.62
Lastly, the Glover court considered the 1981 substitution of contribution for common law indemnity. Because a settlement generally
extinguishes contribution rights against the settling defendant,63 a
nonsettling principal could seek neither common law indemnity nor
contribution from its settling agent. Accordingly, the supreme court
believed it would be inequitable to hold a principal vicariously liable to
the claimant after a reasonable settlement between claimant and
agent. 64
Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc.

3.

After the 1981 Act, the Washington Supreme Court decided
another case involving the effect of a release in a situation of respondeat superior liability. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc. 65 concerned
whether claimants who gave releases knowing they had suffered some
injury were bound by their releases when their injuries later worsened.6 6 One case reviewed in Bennett involved the release of an
employer from vicarious liability.6 7
faith, collusion, or fraud; the extent of the releasing person's investigation and preparation
of the case; and the interests of the parties not being released.

Id. at
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

717, 658 P.2d at 1236.
Id. at 722, 658 P.2d at 1238.
Id.
Id. at 722, 658 P.2d at 1238.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
98 Wash. 2d at 723, 658 P.2d at 1239.

65. 108 Wash. 2d 386, 739 P.2d 648 (1987).

66. Id. at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
67. The case giving Bennett its name arose when an employee driving in the course of his
employment rear-ended an auto, causing a back injury to its occupant. Several months later the
injured driver settled. He had been unable to return to work, but he signed a general release and
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The claimant in Bennett sued both the employer and its employee
for damages. The defendants pleaded the release and convinced the
trial court to grant them summary judgment.6 8 On appeal, the
supreme court conceptualized the problem as one of competing policies: assuring the just compensation of accident victims versus encouraging final private settlements of disputes.6 9 Final settlement
prevailed; the court ruled that a claimant who executed a personal
injury release while aware he had suffered some injury was bound by
his release, regardless of whether the release had been "fairly and
knowingly made."7 0
4.

1986 Tort Reform Act

After the events in Vanderpool, Glover, and Bennett, the Washington Legislature again enacted tort reforms. The 1986 Tort Reform
Act ("1986 Act") abolished joint and several liability for most situations in which it had previously applied. 71 However, the 1986 Act
provided that joint and several liability would still apply to respondeat
superior liability.

72

D. Releases In States With Contribution Statutes
The contribution statutes of many states now follow the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act7 3 by providing that releasing
one of multiple persons liable to a claimant for the same injury does
not discharge any other person liable to the claimant for that injury
unless the release so provides.74 The drafters of Washington's 1981
Act considered the language of the Uniform Act, 75 and included a
provision similar to section 4 of the Uniform Act in Washington's
received a final payment of $5,000. Id at 389, 739 P.2d at 650. A few months later, his back
problem worsened and his doctors concluded that the accident had left him permanently and
totally disabled. Id at 389-90, 739 P.2d at 650.
68. I at 390, 739 P.2d at 650.
69. Id at 394-95, 739 P.2d at 652-53.
70. Id. at 396, 739 P.2d at 653.
71. See 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070 (1987)).
72. "A party shall be responsible for the fault of another person or for the payment of the
proportionate share of another party... when a person was acting as an agent or servant of the
party." 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401(1)(a), at 1358 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 4.22.070(1)(a) (1987)).
73. 12 U.L.A. 57 (1955) [hereinafter UNIFORM ACT].
74. See UNIFORM Acr, supra note 73, § 4, at 98. As of 1987, 20 states had adopted versions
of the Uniform Act. 12 U.L.A. 57 (Master ed. 1975 & Supp. 1987).
75. SENATE REPORT, supra note 44, at 622.
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1981 Act.76 Courts in states with contribution statutes take a variety
of positions in deciding cases involving the claimant's release of one
party to the master-servant or principal-agent relationship.
In Michigan and Tennessee, courts have held their contribution
statutes inapplicable to respondeat superior liability. Like the Uniform Act, the Michigan contribution statute states that the release of
one of two or more persons liable in tort does not release others unless
the release so provides.7 7 Michigan courts have narrowly construed
this statute and its predecessor, holding them inapplicable to respondeat superior cases because the masters and servants in such cases are
not truly joint tortfeasors. Thus, Michigan courts have continued to
rule giving principals and agents the benefit of
follow the common law
78
-each others' releases.
Through different reasoning, the Supreme Court of Tennessee has
reached the same result. Tennessee's Uniform Act states that a
tortfeasor who is entitled to indemnity has no right to contribution,
and that the contribution chapter does not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. 79 The Tennessee court used this statute to
find that its Uniform Act does not embrace vicarious liability cases.
Like the Michigan courts, the Tennessee court then ruled that its Uniform Act had not changed the common law rule extinguishing a
master's derivative liability upon the servant's settlement.80
Unlike the Michigan and Tennessee courts, courts in California,
Delaware, Idaho, and Rhode Island have interpreted their contribution statutes to cover vicarious liability cases and to change the common law rule giving masters and servants the benefit of each others'
releases. In California, Delaware, Idaho, and Rhode Island, the contribution statutes provide that release of one joint tortfeasor does not
76. Compare UNIFORM ACT, supra note 73, § 4, at 98 with 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 14(2)
(codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(2) (1987)).

77. MicH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2925(d) (1986) (MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.2925(4) (Callaghan
1988)).
78. E.g., Geib v. Slater, 320 Mich. 316, 31 N.W.2d 65 (1948), overruled on other grounds;
Moore v. Palmer, 350 Mich. 363, 86 N.W.2d 585, 596-97 (1957); Lincoln v. Gupta, 142 Mich.
App. 615, 370 N.W.2d 312, 316 (1985); Willis v. Total Health Care of Detroit, 125 Mich. App.
612, 337 N.W.2d 20, 22 (1983). The Washington Supreme Court has already precluded
following the Michigan theory: in Glover, the court applied the Washington contribution statutes
to a vicarious liability case. Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 709-24, 658 P.2d
1230, 1232-39 (1983).
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-11-102(f) (1980) (formerly codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 22;
3102(f)). Washington chose not to adopt this provision of the 1955 Uniform Act. Compare
UNIFORM ACT, supra note 73, § l(f), at 64 with WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(3) (1987).
80. Craven v. Lawson, 534 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn. 1976). Washington's abolition of common law
indemnity is a significant statutory difference which would preclude Washington courts from
adopting the Tennessee position.
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release other joint tortfeasors unless the release so specifies."1 Reading
these statutes quite literally, California, Idaho, and Rhode Island
courts have held that releasing an agent from primary liability does
not operate to release the principal from vicarious liability.8 2 Likewise,
Delaware courts have used their contribution statute to preserve an
employee's primary liability after the employer's release.8"
A North Dakota decision illustrates a final interpretation of the
Uniform Act in a vicarious liability case. The North Dakota statute
permits treating a group's liability as a single share "[i]f equity
requires."84 The Supreme Court of North Dakota construed this statute together with the provision of the Uniform Act limiting the effect
of a release to the joint tortfeasor who obtains it, and held that the
plaintiff who releases a servant also gives up any right to recover from
the master because the liability of these defendants constitutes a single
share.8 5
II.

ANALYSIS

A.

Incompleteness of Policy Analysis in Vanderpool

In Vanderpool, the Washington Supreme Court mentioned the policies underlying respondeat superior briefly and indirectly. The court
devoted less than a sentence to its policy discussion, and it acknowledged only the policy of fully compensating tort victims. It ignored
such modem justifications for respondeat superior as fairness, loss
shifting, and loss spreading.86
The rule applied in most states, which treats employer and
employee liability as a single share, has both policy and practical
advantages over the rule followed in Vanderpool. This majority rule
offers the dual policy advantages of better serving the policies behind
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 6304 (1975); IDAHO CODE § 6-805 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-6-7 (1985).
82. Ritter v. Technicolor Corp., 27 Cal. App. 3d 152, 103 Cal. Rptr. 686, 687 (1972); Holve v.
Draper, 95 Idaho 193, 505 P.2d 1265, 1268-69 (1973); Smith v. Raparot, 101 R.I. 565, 225 A.2d
666, 667 (1967). The Washington Supreme Court's contrary holding in Glover, that under the
1981 Act the release of the agents released their principal, forecloses Washington courts from
adopting this position. See Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 721-22, 658 P.2d at 1238.
83. Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747 (Del. 1978).
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-38-02 (1976). This Uniform Act provision resembles
Washington's single entity statute. Compare UNIFORM ACT, supra note 73, § 2, at 87 with
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1987).
85. Horejsi v. Anderson, 353 N.W.2d 316, 318 (N.D. 1984).
86. The court states: "The policy reasons underlying vicarious liability (to afford the plaintiff
the maximum opportunity to be fully compensated) are inapplicable when a plaintiff has
accepted a release from the primarily liable tortfeasor who was financially capable of making him
whole." Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash. 2d 483, 487, 756 P.2d 111, 113 (1988).
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respondeat superior and of furthering other policy aims of tort law not
addressed by the Vanderpool rule.8 7 On a practical level, the majority
rule represents better employee relations than does the rule in
Vanderpool.88
The superiority of the majority rule on a policy level can be illustrated by considering the justifications for respondeat superior.8 9 All
justifications besides that of fully compensating injured parties presume that the employer will shoulder the financial burden of the
employee's tort.90 Holding employers financially responsible for
employee torts results in a better distribution of tort losses through
society.9 1 Further, employers' greater ability to procure liability insurance helps ensure that tort victims will be fully compensated. Holding
employers financially responsible for their employees' on-the-job torts
also addresses both loss prevention and fairness concerns.
By relieving the employee of liability when the employer settles, the
majority rule protects against impoverishment of individuals, an
implicit aim of tort law. Admittedly, the majority rule protects individual employees at the expense of a faultless employer. However, the
fairness justification for respondeat superior holds that it is not inequitable to make an employer responsible for costs arising out of its business. Moreover, one can question whether a rule such as the
Vanderpool rule, which may impoverish employee-tortfeasors, is much
more desirable than a rule which may impoverish tort victims. As
individuals, the employee-tortfeasor and the tort victim are likely to
have comparable resources. When tort costs make either individual a
charge upon society, society suffers equally.9 2
By preventing the reopening of settled claims, the majority rule also
encourages the private settlement of disputes and thus contributes to
judicial economy.9 3 The rule followed in Vanderpool, in contrast,
could actually waste judicial resources if courts take literally the inti-

87.
88.
89.
90.

See infra text accompanying notes 89-93.
See infra text accompanying notes 94-97.
See supra text accompanying notes 31-35.
In practice, employers do appear to shoulder most of this burden. See 2 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, supra note 31, § 26.1, at 1363 ("in the vast majority of cases plaintiff seeks satisfaction
from the employer alone").
91. See supra text accompanying note 33.
92. See D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 11.10, at 778 (1973); 2 F.
HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 26.1, at 1363-64.
93. See Layne v. United States, 460 F.2d 409, 411 (1972).
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mation in the majority opinion that to release an employee94 when the
employer settles always requires a reasonableness hearing.
In addition to the above policy advantages, the majority rule has the
practical advantage of promoting better employee relations than will
result from the Vanderpoolrule. In practice, respondeat superior typically shifts the costs of on-the-job torts from the employees who commit them to their employers."9 When a rule such as the Vanderpool
rule disturbs the usual and expected distribution of losses, employee
morale and efficiency can be expected to suffer.9 6 The Vanderpool rule
may be seen as a form of discipline, for it can create heavier financial
burdens for the employee than serious disciplinary actions like demotion or termination.9 7 Because the Vanderpool rule permits-and perhaps encourages-lawsuits against employees which they must defend
with personal funds, it can be expected to place especially heavy financial burdens upon employees.9"
The 1981 and 1986 Tort Reform Acts show that the court in Van-

derpooloveremphasized full compensation as a policy basis for respondeat superior.

These Acts

demonstrate that the Washington

Legislature does not always consider full compensation the foremost
concern. The 1981 Act instructed courts to evaluate tort settlements

with a reasonableness standard, which indicates that the legislature
viewed the reasonableness of a settlement as more important than the
completeness of the settling claimant's compensation.9 9 The 1986 Act
also deemphasized full compensation by largely abolishing joint and
several liability," ° and by limiting the amount of noneconomic damages a party can recover. 10 1 In short, the 1981 and 1986 Acts legiti94. See Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash. 2d 483 at 491, 503-04, 756 P.2d 111 at
115, 121-22 (1988) (Callow, J., dissenting).
95. See supra note 90.
96. See United States v. Gilman, 347 U.S. 507, 510 (1954).
97. See id. In Gilman, a Federal Tort Claims Act case, the United States Supreme Court
denied the government's indemnity claim against its employee. The Court stated, "[t]he right of
the employer to sue the employee is a form of discipline." Id. at 509-10.
98. See id at 510.
99. See 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 14(1) (codified at WAsH. REV. CODE § 4.22.060(1)
(1987)). Glover requires courts to consider "the releasing person's damages" as merely one of
several factors to be used in determining reasonableness, virtually assuring that "reasonable"
settlements will not afford the claimant full compensation. See supra note 59.
100. See 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401(1) (codified at WAsH. REv. CODE § 4.22.070(1)
(1987)). Joint and several liability historically has been an important means of assuring full
compensation. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 44 at 627.
101. 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 301 (codified at WASH. REv. CODE § 4.56.250 (1987)).
Noneconomic damages are limited to forty-three percent of the state's average annual wage for
the life expectancy of the claimant, with a minimum life expectancy of fifteen years. The
limitation includes derivative claims by persons who did not suffer bodily injury.
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mized judicial concern for the reasonableness of tort compensation
and for the distribution of tort liability among defendants.
Similarly, Washington cases have recognized that other considerations may override the policy of fully compensating tort victims. In
both Bennett and Glover, encouraging final settlements took precedence over ensuring full compensation. In each of these earlier cases,
the plaintiffs left the courtroom with substantially less than full compensation for their injuries. 10 2 In Bennett, the court reasoned that
where the releasing tort victim knew of his injury, the objective of full
compensation must yield to that of final settlement."0 3 Likewise, in
Glover, the court allowed the plaintiff to go without full compensation
because she had had the opportunity to obtain full compensation when
she settled with solvent agents. 10 Inconsistently, however, in Vanderpool the court both ignored the fact that the tort victim had settled
with a solvent principal who was capable of fully compensating her,
and it failed to recognize the policy of encouraging final settlements. 105
Thus, the court in Vanderpool overemphasized full compensation at
the expense of the policy favoring final settlement.
Despite their different results, the facts in Vanderpool parallel the
facts of Bennett. Both plaintiffs were injured by the apparent negli10 6
gence of employees driving within the scope of their employment.
Each plaintiff settled with an employer's insurer before consulting
counsel or filing suit.' 0 7 Each plaintiff appreciated the fact, but not the
seriousness, of her or his injuries. Each plaintiff believed that the settlement provided sufficient funds, but each later discovered that her or
his injuries were worse than previously realized. 10 8 In each case, the
plaintiff sued for damages after her or his injuries failed to improve as
expected. 109
102. In Glover the plaintiff sought damages of $2.5 million but was left by the court with a
settlement of $575,000. See supra note 51. The Bennett opinion does not state how much Mr.
Bennett sought in damages, but it does indicate that his claim for a permanent and totally
disabling injury was settled for medical expenses, just over three months' lost wages, and $5,000.
See supra note 67.
103. Bennett v. Shinoda Floral, Inc., 108 Wash. 2d 386, 396, 739 P.2d 648, 653 (1987).
104. Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 721-24, 658 P.2d 1230, 1238-39
(1983).
105. See Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash. 2d, 483, 487-90, 756 P.2d 111, 113-14
(1988).
106. See id. at 484-85, 756 P.2d at 111-12; Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 388, 739 P.2d at 649.
107. Vanderpool, 110 Wash. 2d at 484-85, 756 P.2d at 112; Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 389, 739
P.2d at 649-50.
108. Vanderpool, 110 Wash. 2d at 485-86, 756 P.2d at 112; Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 389, 739
P.2d at 650.
109. Vanderpool, 110 Wash. 2d at 486, 756 P.2d at 112; Bennett, 108 Wash. 2d at 389-90, 739
P.2d at 650.
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Notwithstanding these factual parallels, Vanderpool and Bennett
differ greatly in result. The supreme court decided that the plaintiff in
Bennett was bound by his settlement and that he could not seek further recovery for his later-discovered disability. In Vanderpool, however, the supreme court permitted the plaintiff to pursue a claim for
her post-release damages. The difference in these results creates an
incentive for injured parties and vicariously liable employers to arrive
at only partial settlements. By naming only the employer in a release,
the claimant can preserve a cause of action against the employee as a
hedge against aggravated or later-discovered injuries. The employer
may similarly find it advantageous not to include the employee in the
settlement: a partial settlement may help the employer argue for a
lower settlement amount. 110
To avoid the inconsistency between Vanderpool and Bennett in the
future, the court should first analyze whether the parties intended the
release to completely settle the claim. Where full settlement was
intended it should not matter who the release was intended to cover.
The employer has fully satisfied the claim, and the plaintiff is not entitled to more than one recovery for the injury. The procedural history
of Vanderpool strongly suggests that the parties there did intend to
fully settle the claim, for the plaintiff at first sought only recission of
the release and a judgment for damages."' Had she truly intended
only a partial settlement and preserved a cause of action against the
112
employee, a recission would not have been necessary.
The court in Vanderpool undermines several rationales for respondeat superior-economic fairness, loss shifting, loss spreading, and
loss prevention-by adopting a rule which fails to take them into
account. Because of the court's incomplete policy analysis, the rule of
Vanderpool frustrates the doctrinally desired result of employer
1 13
responsibility for employee torts.
110. Of course, if a judgment in the future cause of action is paid out of the employer's
insurance policy, as appears will ultimately be the case in Vanderpool, see 110 Wash. 2d at 504,
756 P.2d at 122 (Callow, J., dissenting), the fully insured employer may realize no advantage.
This fact could encourage employers to limit their financial responsibility for employee torts, by
eliminating liability insurance coverage of employees or by choosing to self-insure such risks.
I11. See id at 486, 756 P.2d at 112.
112. See id at 493, 756 P.2d at 116 (Callow, J., dissenting).
113. By providing that "[a] party shall be responsible for the fault of another person ... when
a person was acting as an agent or servant of the party," and by preserving joint and several
liability in this situation, the 1986 legislature indicated that it desired the result produced by
respondeat superior liability. See 1986 Wash. Laws ch. 305, § 401(l)(a) (codified at WASH. REv.
CODE § 4.22.070(1)(a) (1987)).
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Failure To Recognize Glover as ControllingPrecedent

The Washington Court of Appeals recognized the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court in Glover as controlling precedent in the
Vanderpool case." 4 The grounds used by the supreme court to distinguish Glover and to reverse the court of appeals can be categorized as:
1) imputed negligence theory, 2) culpability of the nonsettling party,
3) applicability of the single entity statute, and 4) preservation of contribution causes of action.
1.

Imputed Negligence Theory

The court's first ground for distinguishing Vanderpool from Glover
is consistent with the imputed negligence theory of respondeat superior: the court correctly noted that an agent's settlement undermines
"the very foundation of the principal's liability.""' 5 That the court's
statement is true, however, does not mean that the principal's settlement in Vanderpool should not have the same legal effect as the agent's
settlement in Glover. Respondeat superior uses the fiction of imputed
negligence to achieve a result--employer compensation of the tort victim-which is justified on grounds of public policy. The fact that an
agent's settlement erases the theoretical foundation of the principal's
liability is not a sufficient ground upon which to justify a different
result in Vanderpool than in Glover. Rather, the court should have
examined whether preserving the agent's liability would serve the policy aims of respondeat superior.
2.

Culpability of Nonsettling Party

The supreme court's second means of distinguishing Glover from
Vanderpool was its statement that the policy of assuring the plaintiff
the "maximum opportunity" for full compensation did not require
permitting a plaintiff who had settled with a solvent agent to pursue a
principal who "is only secondarily liable."'116 The court here seems to
focus upon the relative culpability of principal and agent, characterizing the former as innocent. But if vicarious liability is meant to maximize the claimant's opportunities for full compensation, then the
114. The court of appeals did not publish its decision in Vanderpool. Vanderpool v. Grange
Ins. Ass'n, 42 Wash. App. 1032 (1985), rev'd, 110 Wash. 2d 483 (1988). This shows that it
considered its application of Glover to the converse fact pattern in Vanderpool so unremarkable
as to have no precedential value. See WASH. REV. CODE § 2.06.040 (1987)).
115. Vanderpool, 110 Wash. 2d at 487, 756 P.2d at 113.
116. Id.
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culpability of the nonsettling party is irrelevant. 117 Glover teaches that
it is the solvency, not the culpability, of the released party which maximizes the claimant's opportunity for full compensation. 118 Given that
settling with a solvent agent sufficiently maximizes the claimant's
compensation opportunities,' 19 settlement with a solvent principal
should likewise be held to sufficiently maximize the claimant's chance
to be fully compensated.
3. Applicability of Single Entity Statute
Another basis upon which the supreme court in Vanderpool
attempted to distinguish Glover was its statement that there was "no
reason to apply RCW 4.22.040(1) which allows a court to determine
that two or more persons may be treated as a single person."120 As
previously discussed, 2 ' the Glover court had interpreted this single
entity statute to allow the discharge of a principal from vicarious liability when its agent and the claimant reached a reasonable settlement.
Single entity liability is well adapted to the typical situation of
respondeat superior liability.12 2 Respondeat superior liability differs
from joint tortfeasor situations by involving the actual, active negligence of only one party.' 2 3 Under respondeat superior, the liability of
the active and passive tortfeasors is coextensive: so long as the active
tortfeasor is liable, the passive tortfeasor will also be liable, and to the
same extent. 124 Often, as in Vanderpool, an employer-procured insurance policy will provide liability coverage for both the active and passive tortfeasors, and settlement of the claim against that policy will be
achieved by negotiations between the employer's insurance company
125
and the claimant.
117. Indeed, respondent superior imposes liability upon employers despite their lack of
culpability.
118. Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 722, 658 P.2d 1230, 1238 (1983).
119. As Glover, 98 Wash. 2d at 721-24, 658 P.2d at 1238-39, and Vanderpool, 110 Wash. 2d
at 487, 756 P.2d at 113, both indicate.
120. 110 Wash. 2d at 488, 756 P.2d at 113.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
122. The official comment to the Uniform Act gives respondeat superior liability as the
primary example of single entity liability, stating, "the liability of a master and servant for the
wrong of a servant should in fairness be treated as a single share." UNIFORM ACr, supranote 73,

§ 2, at 87, commissioner's comment.
123. See Kinsey v. William Spencer & Son Corp., 165 Misc. 143, 300 N.Y.S. 391, 396 (1937).
124. See id at 143, 300 N.Y.S. 391; Consolidated Gas Utils. Co. v. Beatie, 167 Okla. 71, 27
P.2d 813 (1933). But if the active tortfeasor has a personal defense, the passive tortfeasor may
still be liable. See supra note 28.
125. See Chilcote v. Von Der Ahe Van Lines, 300 Md. 106, 476 A.2d 204, 213 (1984).
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The Vanderpool court failed to explain why the single entity statute
applied in Glover but not in Vanderpool. The absence of a reasonableness determination in Vanderpool was not presented by the court as a
dispositive difference, nor should it be so viewed. The terms of the
single entity statute do not limit its application to cases where a reasonableness hearing has been held. Rather, the statute applies "for
purposes of contribution."1 2 6 The employee in Vanderpool had a
potential contribution action against the settling employer, just as the
principal in Glover had a potential contribution action against its settling agents.12 7 The single entity statute should have been applied in
Vanderpool as it was applied in Glover.
4. Preservationof Contribution Causes of Action
Attempting another distinction from Glover, the Vanderpool court
expressed concern for protecting nonsettling principals from losing
1 28
potential contribution causes of action against their settling agents.
Yet the court ignored nonsettling agents' potential contribution
actions against their settling principals.' 29 Judicial protection of a
nonsettling party's contribution action should not depend on that
party's identity.
Ever since the 1981 Act replaced common law indemnity rights
with contribution rights, Washington law has presented no theoretical
barrier to an agent seeking contribution from a principal. Unlike the
abolished right of common law indemnity, which typically could be
exercised only by passive tortfeasor against active tortfeasor, contribution rights can run in either direction."3 ' Washington statutes permit
assigning a portion of the "fault" to a person subject to strict liability.'
To a vicariously liable party, respondeat superior creates a
form of strict liability. 32 Therefore, under present Washington statutes there is no reason why a vicariously liable employer might not be
found liable to its employee for contribution.
126. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.040(1) (1987).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
128. The Vanderpool court stated that it had been "necessary" to release the principal in
Glover "because a release between a plaintiff and an agent would foreclose any possibility of the

principal receiving contribution from his agent." Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash.
2d 483, 487, 756 P.2d 111, 113 (1988).

129. See infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
130. Because they depend entirely upon the comparative fault of the defendants. WASH.
REV. CODE § 4.22.040 (1987).
131. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.22.015 (1987).
132. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 31, § 26.5, at 1372; PROSSER, supra note 4, § 69, at

499.
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In protecting a contribution cause of action for the principal, but
not for the agent, the Vanderpool court implicitly suggests that the
change from indemnity to contribution was merely formal and that
the legislature simply intended to preserve the status quo between
employer and employee. The only authority cited for this suggestion
was a line in the legislative history of the 1981 Act which stated the
effect of the old rule of indemnity, but which did not express a legislative desire to retain this effect.' 3 3 Other parts of the 1981 Act's legislative history show that the change from contribution to indemnity was
not merely formal. The court did not mention that the purpose of the
1981 Act was to create a more equitable distribution of tort liability,134
because of a "growing dissatisfaction with the all-or-nothing recovery
rules under the prior law."13' 5 The court did not explain that the Senate Report had identified common law indemnity as "another form of
the 'all-or-nothing' rule which is being departed from in this bill which
favors comparative fault principles." 13' 6 These legislative statements
are not the indicia of a mere change in form.
C. Suggested FutureApproach
Providing the claimant with only one recovery for his or her injury
is a basic tenet of the tort system.137 The majority rule of releasing
either employer or employee when the other settles protects against
double recovery by holding the claimant to the remedy elected. In
contrast, by permitting the claimant "to look to both master and servant for recovery when recovery has been accepted from one ... as
payment in full," the rule in Vanderpool permits the claimant "two
' 13
bites of the apple." 1
In Glover, the Washington Supreme Court recognized the opportunity to settle with solvent agents as providing the claimant a sufficient
opportunity for full compensation. 139. There is no reason not to adopt
the same view when the claimant has instead settled with a solvent
133. The court cites the following sentence in the SENATE REPORT: "'Under current law
where the active/passive analysis can be applied, the entire liability can be shifted from the
passive tortfeasor to the active tortfeasor.'" Vanderpool, 110 Wash. 2d at 487, 756 P.2d at 113.

134. See 1981 Wash. Laws ch. 27, § 1.
135. SENATE

REPORT,

supra note 44 at 627.

136. Id. at 636.
137. See Monjay v. Evergreen School Dist. No. 114, 13 Wash. App. 654, 658, 537 P.2d 825,
828 (1975) ("axiomatic that a plaintiff cannot have multiple recovery for a single wrong"),
modified on other grounds, Jensen v. Beaird, 40 Wash. App. 1, 696 P.2d 612 (1985).
138. Vanderpool v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 110 Wash. 2d 483, 494, 756 P.2d 111, 116 (1988)

(Callow, J., dissenting).
139. Glover v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 98 Wash. 2d 708, 718-24, 658 P.2d 1230, 1236-39

(1983).
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principal. The solvency requirement suggested in Glover and reiterated in Vanderpool is an appropriate limitation upon the majority rule
which will further the policy of full compensation. It should be
retained.
Accordingly, the best approach for Washington courts to follow in
future cases like Vanderpool would be a modified version of the majority rule. The claimant who settles with a solvent employer should be
held to have thereby released the employee. The liability of the
employer and the employee should be treated as a single share.
If, for reasons of stare decisis, Washington courts decline to follow
the rule used by a majority of other states, still this state's courts
would do more to encourage finality and prevent double recovery were
they to first consider whether the release at issue was intended to fully
compensate the claimant. If the release was so intended, it should be
immaterial for the claimant's rights that one potential defendant-the
employee-made no monetary contribution to that release."4 The settling employer might legitimately complain that the employee owes it
contribution but the claimant, having accepted a settlement in full,
should have no further recovery.
III.

CONCLUSION

The justification for respondeat superior lies as much in the distribution of tort liability it achieves as it does in our desire to fully compensate the tort victim. Shifting tort losses to the employer through the
fiction of respondeat superior helps avoid impoverishing employees
who inadvertently commit torts; it helps spread the cost of accidents
throughout society; and it holds employers responsible for the costs of
their enterprises.
The holding in Vanderpool may shift significant financial burdens
from employers to individual employees, contrary to the loss shifting,
loss spreading, and fairness policies behind respondeat superior. The
Vanderpool court should have considered these policies in arriving at
its holding. In future similar cases, the court should adopt a rule
which furthers all of the policies behind respondeat superior: a rule
that the release of a solvent employer operates to release its employee.
Karen P. Clark

140. See
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